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TOWARD A FEDERAL CIVIL
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS ACT
PAUL D. CARRINGTON*
"No verbal formula yet devised can explain prior finality decisions with
unerring accuracy or provide an utterly reliable guide for the future."' Surely this
is so. If the federal experience alone did not suffice to convince us that this is true,
then the comparisons provided in the preceding articles of this issue surely lay the
matter to final rest. While jurisdiction after jurisdiction can be found to have
embraced the wisdom that "causes should not come up here in fragments, upon
successive appeals, '2 none has been discussed which has found that wisdom to be a
simple one to be forthrightly applied. With varying degrees of candor and sophisti-
cation, each has hedged the finality requirement with exceptions and qualifica-
tions necessitated by shared perceptions that there are times when forthright
application of a simple rule against piecemeal appeals works injustice and
diseconomy.
There is a unifying theme to the occasions which have resulted in the break-
down of the stricture against piecemeal appeals which is observed repeatedly in
the Interlocutory Restatement on the subject which the editors presented in the
previous issue of this publication. 3 It is that substantial rights, generally adjective
in nature, are often threatened by the nonfinal actions of trial courts. And these
rights cannot always be adequately protected by the courts of appeals if they await
final decision to attempt corrective action. Hence comes the widespread use of the
extraordinary writs as an alternative to appeal. Hence comes the collateral order
doctrine. Hence comes the doctrine of practical finality, of death knells, and more.
Similar considerations have prompted similar accommodations in each of the
jurisdictions we have studied.
It does not follow from these considerations that the constraints against piece-
meal appeals are a bad idea. Edson Sunderland, it is true, did once contend that
the making of exceptions to the rule was pernicious, that once its simplicity is
violated, it would occasion so much dispute that its benefits would not be worth its
costs. 4 While the federal experience may tend in some minds to confirm Professor
Sunderland's assessment, the prevailing wisdom is that moderation in these mat-
ters is appropriate. Moderation, however, does not excuse the unconscionable
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intricacy of the existing law, depending as it does on overlapping exceptions, each
less lucid than the next.
A major obstacle to clarity and reform in the federal practice, and perhaps
elsewhere, has been the reluctance of courts of appeals to be candid in acknowl-
edging the nature and regularity of the exceptions being made. As ready as the
courts of appeals are to use their jurisdiction to assure procedural regularity in the
district courts, they are equally ready to disavow the full implications of their
actions. This is manifested in almost every corner of the Interlocutory Restate-
ment, where almost every exception is accompanied by a reaffirmation of the rule
against piecemeal appeals. And not infrequently, as is most clearly exemplified by
appeals from orders striking insufficient affidavits of bias, the courts of appeals
deny their own power even as they exercise it.5
This ambivalence is doubtless the product of anxiety that candor will open the
floodgates of civil appeals. But the game is up. At least it is my perception that
the bar and the trial bench are generally cognizant that the doors of the courts of
appeals are open to protect substantial rights that cannot be enforced on appeal
after final decision. 6 Only the innocent may be confused or misled by the rhetoric.
It is thus time for reform. Partly because the present thicket is of the courts'
creation, and partly because its underpinning is in the sparse provisions of the
Judicial Code, the reform must be legislative. What is needed is a statutory
machete to trim off the excess elaboration which has grown to conceal the accom-
modations that have been made.
In order to suggest the nature of what should be done, I have tried my hand at
the elevating work of statutory drafting. 7 I do so in the modest expectation that
much further improvement can be wrought by more skilled hands but also in the
equally modest conviction that what is proposed below would be a substantial
advance on the present state of the federal law.
A CIVIL INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS ACT
This proposal is presented as four sections of the Judicial Code, two being revi-
sions and two being new:
§ 1291. Final Decisions of District Courts
(a) The courts of appeals (other than the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit)
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts of the United States, the District Court for the District of the Canal Zone,
the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except
(1) where direct review may be had in the Supreme Court pursuant to sections
1252 or 1253 of this title; or
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(2) exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit under section 1295(a) of this title.
(b) Appellate jurisdiction under this section shall not vest until the final decision
of a district court is set forth on a separate document, signed by the district judge
or magistrate, manifesting the intent of the district court that proceedings in the
case be thereby terminated save for the taxation of costs or enforcement proceed-
ings, and entered on the docket of the district court.
(c) A decree in admiralty which determines the rights and liabilities of the parties
is a final decision even if the proceedings with respect to property subject to the
jurisdiction of the court may continue to a final decree. In other civil cases
involving multiple claims or multiple parties, a partial final decision may be made
in conformity with rules of court promulgated in accordance with section 2072 of
this title.
REVISER'S NOTES
Subsection (a) is the former section 1291 with slight cosmetic modification: the
word "exclusive" is inserted in the second line to replace the last sentence of the
former section with change in meaning. Also, the two exceptions are now
enumerated.
Subsection (b) is new. In describing the formalities of a final decision, the sub-
section merely sets forth the present requirements as stated in Interlocutory
Restatement § 3. It is, however, a change in the law to make these formalities a
precondition to jurisdiction under this section. The effect of the change is to
abolish the doctrine of practical finality, the collateral order doctrine, and all other
exceptions to the final decision requirement which are disguised by the strained
determinations that orders are "final" when they are not so intended by the dis-
trict court. This is not a consequential change in the law, because orders formerly
appealable under these opaque doctrines will be made appealable under the next
section of this title. A benefit of this clarification is that it should reduce the fre-
quency of uncertainty regarding the possible existence of an appealable final
decision.
Subsection (c) is largely new, but effects no change in the law. The first sen-
tence preserves the appealability of orders previously treated as exceptional under
section 1292(a)(3) of this title. The second sentence explicitly authorizes partial
final decisions as prescribed in Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Early doubt about the validity of that rule was resolved in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 435-38 (1956); there appears to be no reason, however, why
the existence of that rule should not be signalled in the statute to which it applies.
See generally Interlocutory Restatement § 4.
§ 1292. Interlocutory Decisions of District Courts
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from interlocutory
orders of the district courts when essential to protect substantial rights which
cannot be effectively enforced on review after final decision. Interlocutory orders
appealable under this subsection shall include those:
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(1) granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions, or
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where direct review may
be had in the Supreme Court;
(2) appointing receivers or refusing to wind up receiverships or to take steps to
accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing the sales or other
disposals of property;
(3) determining all issues in a civil action for patent infringement in form final
except for an accounting; or
(4) designated as appealable orders by rule of court promulgated in accord-
ance with section 2072 of this title.
(b) When a district court shall be of the opinion that an order involves a control-
ling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, it shall so state in writing in such order. The
Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken
from such order.
(c) An appeal under this section shall be taken to the court of appeals which
would have jurisdiction to review a final decision when entered, as provided in
sections 1294 and 1295 of this title.
REVISER'S NOTES
The first sentence of subsection (a) is new. It is declaratory of existing practice,
if not of existing doctrine. By authorizing interlocutory appeals when essential to
protect substantial rights which cannot be effectively enforced on review after final
decision, it eliminates the necessity for strained interpretations of finality under
section 1291, and the use of extraordinary writs under section 1651 as an alterna-
tive to appeal. See Interlocutory Restatement § 12. In making the statute conform
to the realities of present federal practice, it is not intended to effect significant
change in that practice. It is, however, possible that a few cases which might
otherwise become embroiled in the intricacies of the collateral order doctrine or
the uncertainties of mandamus law will be decided without regard to former tech-
nicalities. The effect of the reform should be to direct appellate courts and lawyers
to the real considerations to be weighed in resolving issues of appellate jurisdiction,
and to reduce the confusion that attends the present federal law. It will also elimi-
nate the anomaly that presently exists with respect to the place of filing an inter-
locutory appeal. See Interlocutory Restatement § 13.
Enumerated clauses (1) and (2) are not new, but simply preserve the existing
legislation regarding appeals from preliminary injunction orders and receivership
orders. The former provision of section 1292(a) (3) has been moved in this revision
to section 1291(c). The new section 1292(a)(3) was section 1292(c)(2) being
returned to its former location in section 1292(a).
Enumerated clause (4) is new and makes explicit that the rulemaking power
does extend to the specification of appealable interlocutory decisions generally as
defined in the first sentence of the subsection. It is contemplated that this
rulemaking power may be used initially to clarify certain quiddities of the present
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established law, such as the astonishing rule with regard to appeals from orders
granting or denying stays pending arbitration, see Interlocutory Restatement § 17,
or the rule denying appeals from orders directing civil arrest pending trial, see
Interlocutory Restatement § 19. This section is probably not necessary to validate
such rules, cf. Sears, Roebuck &Co. v. Macky, 351 U.S. 427, 435-38 (1956), but the
use of the rulemaking power in this context is appropriately encouraged. There is
no reason to conceal its existence from the reader of the controlling legislation.
Section 1292(b) remains, but with three clauses stricken. One ellipsis removes
the requirement for certification that the order be one not otherwise appealable; a
redundant certificate is harmless and there is no reason to require the trial court to
appraise the limits of interlocutory appealability as a precondition to appeala-
bility. Another ellipsis imposed a ten day limitation period for applications for
leave to appeal; all other limitations on appeals are expressed only in the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure. This one is also expressed therein. Inasmuch as this
revision explicitly approves such rulemaking, there seems to be no reason to pre-
serve this particular limitation in the statute. The third ellipsis is the proviso that
there shall be no stay pending appeal unless ordered by a judge; the only conse-
quence of this proviso seems to be to preclude a magistrate from granting a stay
and this consequence seems unintended since the language of the proviso antedates
the existence of federal magistrates. The subject of stays is comprehensively con-
trolled by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and there is no
apparent need for a specific statutory provision regarding stays pending certified
interlocutory appeals.
Subsection (c) is new. It effects a change in authorizing certified interlocutory
appeals under section 1292(b) to be taken to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in cases within the subject matter jurisdiction of that court.
See Interlocutory Restatement § 2. It replaces former subsection (c)(1) which
authorizes interlocutory appeals under section 1292(a) to be taken to the Federal
Circuit. Former subsection (c)(2) has been returned in this revision to its former
place in subsection (a).
The former subsection (d) is omitted from section 1292 because it pertains to
orders of tribunals other than district courts. It is intended that this subsection be
appended to section 1295 (not reprinted here) as section 1295(d). This is an appro-
priate location because the subsection pertains only to matters within the subject
matter jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
§ 1297. Time for Appeal
The time for appeal under sections 1291, 1292, and 1293 may be limited by
rule of court promulgated under section 2072 of this title. An appeal shall not be
dismissed for untimeliness if the appellant did not receive notice of the adverse
decision at the time at which the time for appeal commenced to run.
REVISER'S NOTES
This section is new.
The first sentence merely approves the present practice manifested in Rules 4
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and 5(d) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The second sentence would
change the law as stated in Interlocutory Restatement § 7. The present law cannot
be defended; it stands out as a unique situation in contemporary federal practice,
for in no other instance can important rights be lost by mere passivity not
involving neglect. It is, of course, rare that the notice which the clerk of court is
directed to give is not given and received; but those rare cases which do occur
result in unseemly harshness. A party favored by decision, who is concerned that
the time for appeal be brought to an early termination, can protect himself against
the risk of a failure of notice by taking the initiative of notifying the party against
whom the decision was made.
§ 1298. Jurisdictional Objections
(a) A defect of appellate jurisdiction under sections 1291, 1292, 1293, and 1297, or
rules of court promulgated pursuant to these sections, may be waived and appel-
late jurisdiction conferred by consent of the parties. Rules of court may be
promulgated pursuant to section 2072 of this title which limit the time for making
motions to dismiss appeals for unripeness or untimeliness.
(b) An otherwise timely appeal taken to the wrong court of appeals shall be trans-
ferred to the court of appeals designated by sections 1294, 1295, or 1292(c),
whether or not any party seeks such a transfer.
REVISER'S NOTES
This section is new.
Subsection (a) would result in a change in the law. The present law treats
ripeness and timeliness as jurisdictional in the sense that they are objections that
cannot be waived and must be raised by the court sua sponte. See Interlocutory
Restatement §§ 6 and 12. This is a fetish which serves no significant systemic
interest; the status and authority of the district court is scarcely threatened by the
consideration of an appeal that is out of time. In this respect, the requirements of
appellate jurisdiction are not unlike those of jurisdiction over the person or prop-
erty of the civil defendant, which are subject to waiver under Rule 12(h) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By fixing time limits for the raising of such
issues, the rules can require timely resolution of any issues regarding the ripeness or
timeliness of an appeal. Belated presentation of such issues can be dilatory and
inefficient.
Subsection (b) recognizes the quite different nature of the issue presented when
an appeal which should go to the Federal Circuit is taken to a regional circuit, or
vice versa. It is important to the attainment of the doctrinal stability which the
Federal Circuit was organized to achieve that that court maintain the exclusivity
of its jurisdiction. Hence the matter is more like the subject matter jurisdiction of
the district courts which is not subject to waiver under Rule 12(h). There is, how-
ever, no reason to dismiss an appeal that is otherwise timely merely because the
appellant has mistaken the court of appeals to which the appeal should be
addressed. Compare section 1406 of this title.
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